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RELIGIOUS LAW (ESPECIALLY ISLAMIC LAW) IN 
AMERICAN COURTS 
EUGENE VOLOKH* 
I. Introduction 
Many people worry about the possible encroachment of Sharia—Islamic 
law—into the American legal system. Oklahoma voters banned the use of 
Sharia and other religious law, though the Tenth Circuit struck down the 
ban precisely because it singled out Sharia by name.1 Other state 
legislatures have considered similar bans.2 
But in many of the instances that critics see as improper “creeping 
Sharia,”3 it is longstanding American law that calls for recognizing or 
implementing an individual’s religious principles, including Islamic 
principles. American law provides for freedom of contract and disposition 
of property at death. Muslims (like Christians, Jews, and the irreligious) can 
therefore write contracts and wills to implement their understanding of their 
religious obligations. American law provides for arbitration with parties’ 
consent.4 Muslims can use this to route their disputes to Muslim tribunals, 
just like Christians, Jews, and the irreligious often route their disputes to 
private arbitrators of their choice.  
                                                                                                                 
 * Gary T. Schwartz Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law (volokh@law.ucla.edu). 
Many thanks to the University of Oklahoma College of Law for inviting me to give the 
Henry Lecture in March 2013; this article is based on that lecture. 
 1. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1128-29 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 2. See, e.g., H.B. 2582, 50th Leg., 1st Sess. (Ariz. 2011); H.R.J. Res. 1004, 86th Sess. 
(S.D. 2011). 
 3. See, e.g., About, CREEPING SHARIA, http://creepingsharia.wordpress.com/about-2/ 
(last visited Sept. 22, 2013).  
 4. E.g., 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
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American law provides for religious exemptions from generally 
applicable laws and from employer regulations. Muslims, as well as 
Christians, Jews, and others, may claim such exemptions.5 American law 
provides for the use of foreign law in certain cases stemming from foreign 
occurrences (marriages, divorces, injuries, and the like).6 Sometimes this 
calls for the use of foreign religious law, whether Islamic law, Jewish law, 
or the decisions of Christian tribunals. 
Of course, American law also imposes limiting principles on these 
doctrines. Some contracts and foreign judgments are unenforceable.7 Many 
religious exemption requests are denied.8 But these limiting principles, I 
argue below, already adequately prevent improper recognition of Islamic 
law and allow recognition of such law when recognition is proper. There is 
no need for new law here. The current principles just need to be applied 
equally to all situations, whether those situations involve Islamic law or 
other law. 
In my experience, much of the criticism of the use of Sharia in American 
courts has come from the political Right. And I myself am generally a 
political conservative, and one who shares some of the concerns about the 
use of Islamic law in certain contexts. 
Indeed, I have often criticized the bad conduct of various Muslim 
countries’ governments, especially suppression of perceived blasphemy or 
apostasy.9 I have criticized the occasions on which American officials have 
restricted speech because it was offensive to Muslims,10 or failed to protect 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See Eugene Volokh, Some Background on Religious Exemption Laws, THE VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (June 12, 2010, 7:07 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2010/06/12/some-back 
ground-on-religious-exemption-law-2/.  
 6.  See generally Eugene Volokh, Foreign Law in American Courts, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 
219 (2014).   
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. See infra Part V. 
 9. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Singaporean Resort Owner in Malaysia Arrested, Loses 
Permanent Residency, for Letting Buddhists Meditate in Muslim Prayer Room, THE VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Aug. 19, 2013, 2:59 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/08/19/signaporean-
resort-owner-in-malaysia-arrested-loses-permanent-residency-for-letting-buddhists-meditate-
in-muslim-prayer-room/; Eugene Volokh, 7 Years in Prison + 600 Lashes in Saudi Arabia for 
“Insulting Islam,” THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 1, 2013, 12:53 PM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2013/08/01/7-years-in-prison-600-lashes-in-saudi-arabia-for-insulting-
islam/; Eugene Volokh, Schoolteacher in Egypt Fined $14,000 for Allegedly Insulting Islam, 
THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 17, 2013, 2:37 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/06/17/ 
schoolteacher-fined-100000-in-egypt-for-allegedly-insulting-islam/.  
 10. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Terry Jones Jailed, Apparently for Refusing to Promise 
Not to Demonstrate in Front of a Mosque, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 22, 2011, 7:19 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss3/1
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such speech against private violence.11 I have publicly defended those who 
published the Mohammed cartoons, and I published the cartoons myself on 
my blog.12 I was also apparently the first person to write about (and to 
condemn) one example often relied on by the anti-Sharia movement13—
S.D. v. M.J.R., the New Jersey case in which a trial court judge refused to 
issue a restraining order against a Moroccan Muslim husband who allegedly 
raped his wife.14 
Nonetheless, I think many other complaints about incidents of alleged 
“creeping Sharia” in American law are misguided, partly because the 
complaints miss the way those incidents simply reflect well-settled (and 
sound) American law. Indeed, the alternative approach that I offer is, I 
think, a conservative approach. It urges courts to continue following well-
established American legal traditions rather than distorting those traditions 
either in favor of Islam or against. I will explain this below by surveying 
various areas in which American law arguably implements or recognizes 
Islamic law, and discussing how my proposed approach—simply 
evenhandedly applying established American legal principles—would play 
out in those areas. 
  
                                                                                                                 
PM), http://www.volokh.com/2011/04/22/dearborn-jury-holds-terry-jones-may-be-barred-
from-organizing-rally-outside-mosque/. 
 11. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Charges Dismissed in Pennsylvania Prosecution for 
Attack on “Zombie Mohammed” Atheist Parader, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 24, 2012, 
12:12 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/02/24/charges-dismissed-in-pennsylvania-prosecu 
tion-for-attack-on-zombie-mohammed-atheist-parader/. 
 12. Eugene Volokh, The Twelve Mohammed Cartoons, in Detail, THE VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Mar. 10, 2006, 6:01 PM), http://www.volokh.com/posts/1142035265.shtml. 
 13. Eugene Volokh, Cultural Defense Accepted as to Nonconsensual Sex in New Jersey 
Trial Court, Rejected on Appeal, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 23, 2010, 5:45 PM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2010/07/23/cultural-defense-accepted-as-to-nonconsensual-sex-in-
new-jersey-trial-court-rejected-on-appeal/. Searching for new jersey and morocc! in Lexis 
Advance, limited to 7/20/2010 to 7/25/2010, finds no earlier stories; a 7/24/2010 post on an 
anti-Sharia site, Atlas Shrugs, links to the volokh.com post. Pamela Geller, Sharia (Islamic) 
Law in New Jersey Court: Muslim Husband Rapes, Beats, Sexually Abuses Wife, Judge Sees 
No Sexual Assault Because Islam Forbids Wives to Refuse Sex, ATLAS SHRUGS (July 24, 2010, 
11:35 PM), http://atlasshrugs2000.typepad.com/atlas_shrugs/2010/07/sharia-islamic-law-in-
new-jersey-court-muslim-husband-rapes-beats-sexually-abuses-wife-judge-sees-no.html. 
 14. 2 A.3d 412, 418-19 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010). The husband was later indeed 
convicted of rape. Michaelangelo Conte, Bayonne Husband Convicted of Sexually 
Assaulting Wife; She Testified He Told Her “This Is According to Our Religion”, JERSEY J. 
(Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.nj.com/news/jjournal/ bayonne/index.ssf?/base/news-6/
128522312420240.xml&coll=3. 
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II. Enforcing Contracts and Wills That Are Motivated by Islamic Law 
People sometimes write contracts or wills motivated by their desire to 
follow or accommodate their felt obligations under Islamic law. A union 
and a business might, for instance, negotiate a contract that gives a day off 
for a Muslim holiday.15 A lender and a borrower may structure a financial 
transaction in a way that complies with Islamic law related to financing and 
insurance, but still gives the lender the economic payoff it seeks.16  
People may contract for binding arbitration of their agreements under 
Islamic law.17 A father may leave a will that, following Islamic law, leaves 
each daughter only half as much as it leaves each son.18 A groom may enter 
into a customary Islamic agreement that commits him to pay a “mahr,” an 
agreed-on amount of money to be given his future wife in the event of a 
divorce.19 And these contracts or wills can then be enforced by secular, 
American courts. 
As some of the footnotes above note, many people have expressed 
concern about the enforcement of such arrangements, arguing that this is an 
example of “stealth Sharia” making its way into American law, or arguing 
                                                                                                                 
 15. See Tyson Plant Drops Labor Day for Muslim Holiday, FOX NEWS (Aug. 5, 2008), 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2008/08/05/tyson-plant-drops-labor-day-for-muslim-holiday 
(reporting on the incident, and reporting on people criticizing this as alleged intrusion of 
Sharia into American law); Bob Unruh, Tyson Chicken Replaces Labor Day With Muslim 
Eid al-Fitr—Workers Wanted Islamic Religious Event Recognized, NEVILLE AWARDS (Aug. 
2, 2008), http://www.nevilleawards.com/stealth_sharia7.shtml (criticizing this as supposed 
“stealth Sharia”); Eugene Volokh, Tyson Plant Drops Labor Day for Muslim Holiday, THE 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 6, 2008, 5:42 PM), http://www.volokh.com/posts/1218058942.
 shtml. 
 16. See Murray v. Geithner, 763 F. Supp. 2d 860 (E.D. Mich. 2011); Eugene Volokh, 
Lawsuit Alleging That AIG’s Use of Sharia-Compliant Financing Violates the Establishment 
Clause Survives a Motion to Dismiss, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 27, 2009, 6:55 PM), 
http://www.volokh.com/posts/1243464959.shtml; see also creeping, Bahraini Bank Buying 
“Shariah-Compliant” Real Estate . . . in the U.S., CREEPING SHARIA (Nov. 28, 2011), http://
creepingsharia.wordpress.com/2011/11/28/bahraini-bank-buying-shariah-compliant-real-esta 
te-in-the-u-s/.  
 17. See Eugene Volokh, Religious Arbitration of Civil Disputes, THE VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Sept. 11, 2009, 2:30 PM), http://volokh.com/posts/1252693856.shtml. 
 18. Alkhafaji v. TIAA-CREF Individual & Inst. Servs., 10 Pa. D. & C. 5th 449, 462-63 
(Pa. Com. Pl. Jan. 14, 2010), rev’d, 24 A.3d 454 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011); Eugene Volokh, Will 
Calls for Distribution “According to Islamic Laws and Sharia”; Pennsylvania Court Gives 
Twice as Much to Each Son as to Each Daughter, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 29, 2011, 
5:44 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2011/04/29/will-calls-for-distribution-according-to-islamic-
laws-and-sharia-pennsylvania-court-gives-twice-as-much-to-each-son-as-to-each-daughter/. 
 19. creeping, Islamic Divorce in the U.S., CREEPING SHARIA (Apr. 17, 2011), http://
 creepingsharia.wordpress.com/2011/04/17/islamic-divorce-in-the-u-s/. 
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that Muslims are often pressured by their communities or families into 
creating such arrangements. But all we see here is the application of 
American secular law, and in particular American principles of freedom of 
contract and freedom of testamentary disposition. Those principles should 
apply as much to Muslims as to Jews, Christians, or members of other 
religions. 
Jews and Christians may enter into contracts providing for religious 
arbitration of their disputes20 (including in situations where there is a good 
deal of community pressure to enter into such contracts). Jews and 
Christians may negotiate with employers to get days off on their religious 
holidays, such as Rosh Hashanah or Good Friday.21  
Jews and Christians may organize their investments in ways influenced 
by their religions, for instance investing in funds that promise not to 
participate in projects that the religion views as sinful.22 A Jewish couple 
may agree that, if the husband gets a secular divorce, he will nonetheless 
pay the wife $100/day until he gives her a Jewish religious divorce.23 
Muslims are just as entitled to take advantage of the American tradition of 
freedom of contract as are the nonreligious or members of other religions. 
Of course, not all contracts are enforceable. No American court would 
enforce a contract provision requiring that someone found guilty of theft by 
an arbitration tribunal have his hand chopped off. American courts won’t 
order an action that constitutes a crime (in this instance, the crime of 
mayhem). Indeed, they won’t enforce contractual provisions that call for 
                                                                                                                 
 20. See, e.g., Gen. Conference of Evangelical Methodist Church v. Evangelical 
Methodist Church of Dalton, Ga., Inc., 807 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (N.D. Ga. 2011) (Christian 
arbitration); Glatzer v. Glatzer, 905 N.Y.S.2d 607 (App. Div. 2010) (Jewish arbitration); 
Spivey v. Teen Challenge of Fla., Inc., 122 So.3d 986 (Fla. Ct. App. 2013) (Christian 
arbitration); Glenn G. Waddell & Judith M. Keegan, Christian Conciliation: An Alternative 
to “Ordinary” ADR, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 583 (1998). 
 21. See, e.g., Charlotte Anthony, Rosh Hashanah: At New Year, Jews Grapple with 
Work-Faith Conflicts, JWEEKLY (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.jweekly.com/article/full/ 
66457/at-new-year-jews-grapple-with-work-faith-conflicts/.  
 22. See, e.g., Ezra Reichman, Jerusalem—First-Ever Halacha-Compliant Approval for 
Investment Firm, VOS IZ NEIAS (Mar. 22, 2009, 8:47 AM), http://www.vosizneias.com/
29170/2009/03/22/jerusalem-first-ever-halacha-compliant-approval-for-investment-firm/; 
New Look at Ethical Investing, THE LUTHERAN (July 2005), https://www.thelutheran.org/ 
article/article.cfm?article_id=5179. 
 23. See Light v. Light, No. NNHFA124051863S, 2012 WL 6743605, at *6 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Dec. 6, 2012) (upholding such an agreement). 
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unreasonable penalties rather than compensation, even when only monetary 
penalties are at issue.24 
Likewise, a prenuptial contract that waives one party’s child support 
obligations, or provides for a particular decision about future child custody, 
is generally not enforceable.25 Most state courts take the view that such 
contracts between spouses cannot decide the rights of children, who are not 
parties to the contract.26 Similarly, many state courts don’t allow for 
arbitration of child custody questions.27 
It is also possible that an arbitration decision might be invalidated if 
there is evidence that the arbitrators discriminated based on race, religion, 
or sex against one of the parties to the arbitration.28 In some situations, rules 
of Islamic and Orthodox Jewish law can call for discriminatory treatment of 
witnesses based on sex (and of course other arbitrators can discriminate for 
their own reasons, quite apart from religion).29 If such rules are applied in a 
way that affects the outcome of an arbitration, then it is possible that secular 
courts will refuse to enforce the result of the arbitration.30  
American law, then, already provides tools for refusing to enforce 
contracts that are deemed improper; there is no need for some special 
contract law rule focused on Sharia. Religious motivation cannot validate 
contracts that are invalid for the reasons described above. But neither 
should religious motivation invalidate contracts that would otherwise be 
valid. 
So the proper approach to Sharia-motivated contracts or wills should be 
simple: continue to follow traditional American contract law principles. The 
strong presumption in American law is freedom of contract and freedom to 
dispose one’s property by will; an Islamic motivation, or any other religious 
                                                                                                                 
 24. See, e.g., Crosby Forrest Prods., Inc. v. Byers, 623 So. 2d 565, 567 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1993); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (1981). 
 25. See, e.g., Grimes v. Grimes, 621 A.2d 211, 213-14 (Vt. 1992); Mendoza v. 
Mendoza, 870 P.2d 421, 423 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). 
 26. See, e.g., Grimes, 621 A.2d at 214. 
 27. Elizabeth Jenkins, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Provisions for 
Arbitration of Disputes as to Alimony or Support Payments or Child Visitation or Custody 
Matters, 38 A.L.R.5TH 69 (current through 2009). 
 28. See, e.g., Betz v. Pankow, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834 (Ct. App. 1993). I say “might” 
because the matter seems not to be settled under American law. 
 29. See Eugene Volokh, Orthodox Jewish Arbitrations, Islamic Arbitrations, and 
Discrimination Against Witnesses Based on Sex or Religion, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 
21, 2010, 6:05 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2010/10/21/orthodox-jewish-arbitrations-and-
discrimination-against-witnesses-based-on-sex-or-religion/. 
 30. Id. (citing Betz, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 837).  
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motivation, doesn’t make a contract or a will unenforceable. But if the 
contract or will violates established public policy principles, for instance if 
it calls for improper remedies (the chopped-off hand), or violates family 
law limitations on prenuptial agreements, then it is unenforceable—again, 
without regard to its religious motivation.  
III. Enforcing Contracts or Wills That Call for  
Courts to Interpret Islamic Law 
Parties can also write contracts or wills that call for the interpretation and 
application of Islamic law by courts (rather than just by arbitrators). Thus, a 
contract among the founders of a mosque might call for interpretation under 
Islamic law,31 or a man’s will might call for his property to be divided 
under Islamic law.32 
Here, too, there is well-settled American law—but under this law, these 
contracts are not enforceable, though merely religiously motivated contracts 
(see Part II) are enforceable.33 The difference is that, under the Supreme 
Court’s Establishment Clause precedents, secular judges are not allowed to 
interpret Islamic law (or Jewish law or Biblical law), and to decide what it 
“really” means.  
If parties want to order their relationships through religious legal rules, 
they can set forth the rules themselves in their contracts or wills, for 
instance by saying, “I leave my daughter Deborah 1/3 of my property and 
my son Samuel 2/3.” There is no antidiscrimination rule for testators, 
obligating them not to play favorites among their children, whether based 
on sex or any other reason.  
Likewise, parties can provide for the contract or will to be authoritatively 
interpreted by some private party. They can, for instance, say, “I ask the 
head Imam of [a particular named mosque] to arrange for the distribution of 
my property according to Islamic law.” Or they can provide that disputes 
                                                                                                                 
 31. See William R. Levesque, Appeals Court Won’t Stop Hillsborough Judge From 
Considering Islamic Law, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Oct. 24, 2011, 12:40 PM), 
http://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/civil/appeals-court-wont-stop-hillsborough-judge-from-
considering-islamic-law/1198321; Eugene Volokh, “The Case Should Proceed Under 
Ecclesiastical Law” / Jews, Ketubahs, and Gets, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 26, 2011, 10:14 
AM), http://www.volokh.com/?p=52120. 
 32. See supra note 18. 
 33. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary 
Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969); Central Coast 
Baptist Ass’n v. First Baptist Church of Las Lomas, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 100, 116-17 (Ct. App. 
2007).  
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under an agreement be arbitrated by a particular Islamic arbitral 
organization. But parties cannot ask secular courts to interpret Islamic law 
themselves, by saying, “I leave my property to be distributed according to 
Islamic law.”34 
Again, though, there is no reason to create any special rules for Sharia 
here. First Amendment law already precludes secular courts from deciding 
what Islamic law calls for—just as it precludes them from determining what 
other religions’ rules call for. 
IV. Use of Foreign Law That Incorporates Religious Law 
While American courts cannot and should not decide what Sharia calls 
for, and thus cannot enforce contracts that call for the application of Sharia, 
American courts rightly do consider the law of foreign countries that apply 
Sharia. In doing so, courts don’t purport to decide what Islamic law actually 
requires. They simply try to identify what law would be applied by the 
courts of the foreign country, whether that country is Saudi Arabia, Israel, 
or Greece. 
A. Example: Family Law 
Let’s begin with a common scenario: A family legally moves to America 
from Israel. American law will often ask the question: Are the father and 
mother married to each other? That’s relevant under immigration law.35 It’s 
                                                                                                                 
 34. I’ve sometimes heard people argue that such contracts (or wills) can be enforced if 
the court seeks only to determine what the parties (or the testator) understood “Islamic law” 
to require, rather than what Islamic law supposedly actually requires. But I don’t think this 
can work.  
If the question is, “What did the decedent understand Islamic law [or Presbyterian 
teachings] to require?,” there will rarely be clear evidence to answer that question based on 
the decedent’s personal views (e.g., a letter in which he explained his views of his religion as 
applied to the particular will). Rather, there will be evidence that the decedent belonged to 
some particular denomination, and that that the religious law of that denomination is this-
and-such—plus likely rival views from some more “reformed” or more “orthodox” branch 
of the denomination saying that the true religious law of that denomination is something 
else. This is not the sort of “neutral principle” inquiry that “promises to free civil courts 
completely from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice,” which 
was endorsed by Jones, 443 U.S. at 603. Rather, it’s closer to the inquiry into “religious 
doctrine and practice” condemned by Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 449.  
 35. See, e.g., Hassan v. Holder, 604 F.3d 915, 925 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Nabil was granted 
an F-24 Immigrant Visa as an unmarried child of a lawful permanent resident. Under 
[federal immigration regulations], Nabil (and Sawsan, derivatively) would be deportable . . . 
if Nabil and Sawsan were actually married when Nabil entered the United States. 
Accordingly, the government had the burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss3/1
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relevant under family law, for instance if one of them wants to marry 
someone else, claiming that they were never married. It’s relevant under 
other laws, such as a spouse’s legal right not to testify against the other 
spouse in court. 
Now if the couple had married in America, a court could easily verify 
their marriage by determining whether they obtained the proper license and 
met the proper legal formalities. But they got married in Israel, long before 
they came to America. Unsurprisingly, their marriage therefore does not 
comply with the usual American formalities. (Neither would a Canadian 
marriage nor a German marriage.) How can we tell whether they are indeed 
married? 
American law has long had a well-settled rule on these matters: a 
purported marriage is valid under American law so long as it is valid under 
the law of the country where the marriage was entered into.36 There are of 
course exceptions for marriages that are considered contrary to public 
policy, such as polygamous marriages.37 But setting those aside, a purported 
marriage entered into in Israel is valid for our purposes if it was valid under 
Israeli law. 
Yet Israeli law provides that family law questions must be resolved 
under the law of the religious community to which the parties belong.38 A 
Muslim couple’s marriage is thus evaluated to see if it complies with the 
formalities required by Sharia. Thus, under normal American legal 
principles, deciding whether two people married in Israel are legally 
married for American purposes requires determining whether the Sharia 
formalities were complied with in Israel. (Of course, this is even more 
clearly true as to marriages entered into in countries that generally 
incorporate Sharia rules into their family law, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, 
and Pakistan.39) 
There’s no grand or controversial issue of multiculturalism involved 
here. It’s just our legal system’s normal accommodation to the longstanding 
reality that people come to America from all over the world. Our system 
                                                                                                                 
the marriage between Petitioners occurred before their entry into the country. The validity of 
a marriage is determined by the law of the place of celebration. Pursuant to Israeli law, the 
Sharia courts (and Sharia law) control personal status matters of Muslims residing in 
Jerusalem.”) (citations omitted). 
 36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971). 
 37. Id. § 283(2) cmt. k. 
 38. See Hirschkorn v. Hait, 2008 WL 695892, at *7-8 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 
17, 2008) (noting this and enforcing the order of an Israeli Rabbinical Court entered in an 
Israeli Jewish divorce). 
 39. See L. Ali Khan, The Qur’an and the Constitution, 85 TUL. L. REV. 161, 168 (2010). 
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provides the same accommodation to people from England, Poland, Israel, 
and Saudi Arabia.  
In some situations, this accommodation indirectly requires the 
application of Sharia, but it provides no greater deference to Sharia than it 
would to the application of any country’s law. And while our legal system 
rejects some aspects of Sharia, such as the allowance of polygamy, it 
tolerates other aspects, such as the specification of what formalities are 
required to create a marriage. This is no different from how American law 
does not categorically reject Canadian opposite-sex marriages, even though 
Canadian same-sex marriages are not recognized under the law of most 
American states.40 
B. Example: Tort Law 
Now let’s turn to another scenario: An American tourist goes to Saudi 
Arabia on a trip and gets injured at the hotel where she’s staying. She 
returns to America and sues the hotel in American courts.41 (Assume the 
hotel company does enough business in America that American courts have 
jurisdiction over it.) 
In most states, the well-settled rule in such cases is to apply the tort law 
of the place in which the injury occurred. (Some states follow this as a 
pretty rigid rule,42 while in others it is a usual outcome of the balancing of 
several factors.43) After all, we shouldn’t expect Guatemalan, Taiwanese, or 
Saudi hotels to be subject to American rules as to injuries to their American 
tourists, German rules as to their German tourists, and so on. It makes more 
sense to accept that Saudi hotels’ actions are to be judged under Saudi law 
and subject to Saudi rules with respect to, say, punitive damages or 
reduction of liability owing to the patron’s negligence.  
But in order to do that, American courts have to follow Saudi law, which 
is Sharia. Naturally, they wouldn’t follow Sharia procedural rules, 
especially ones that violate American public policy (such as the devaluing 
of the testimony of female witnesses).44 But other Sharia rules, for instance 
                                                                                                                 
 40. E.g., O’Darling v. O’Darling, 2008 OK 71, 188 P.3d 137.  
 41. See Rhodes v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 9 Mass. L. Rptr. 355 (Super. Ct. 1999). 
 42. See, e.g., Precision Gear Co. v. Cont’l Motors, Inc., No. 1110786, 2013 WL 
3481949, at *3 (Ala. 2013). 
 43. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 145(2)(a) (1971). 
 44. See, e.g., JAMAL J. NASIR, THE STATUS OF WOMEN UNDER ISLAMIC LAW AND UNDER 
MODERN ISLAMIC LEGISLATION 61, 62, 178 (3d ed. 2009); Perry S. Smith, Silent Witness: 
Discrimination Against Women in the Pakistani Law of Evidence, 11 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 21, 44 (2003). 
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those related to the kind and magnitude of damages allowed,45 should be 
applied, just as similar French or Greek rules46 would be applied in other 
cases.47 
There are other such examples, for instance involving contract law or the 
law of judgments.48 But I think the family law and the tort law examples 
suffice to illustrate the point—to decide whether American courts should 
apply foreign law that incorporates Sharia, we should simply follow 
traditional American choice-of-law principles that cover all foreign law. 
V. Allowing Muslims to Claim Broadly Available Religious Exemptions 
from Generally Applicable Laws or Work Rules  
Many states have legal rules that call for religious exemptions from 
generally applicable state and local laws.49 Some such rules are enacted by 
statute, using so-called “Religious Freedom Restoration Acts.”50 Other such 
rules have stemmed from state courts’ interpretations of the state 
constitution’s religious freedom provisions.51 Likewise, the federal 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act mandates similar exemptions from 
federal laws.52  
By and large, such “religious accommodation” regimes provide that 
religious objectors may get exemptions even from generally applicable laws 
unless denying the exemption is necessary to serve a compelling 
government interest.53 So if a government action requires someone to do 
something that he sees as religiously forbidden (e.g., working on the 
Sabbath), then sometimes—but not always—the objector will be able to get 
an exemption.54 The same is true if a government action forbids someone 
from doing something he sees as religiously required (e.g., wearing 
                                                                                                                 
 45. See, e.g., McGhee v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 871 F.2d 1412, 1422 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 46. See, e.g., GEORGE A. BERMANN & ETIENNE PICARD, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 
261 (2008) (“French law formally rejects the notion of punitive damages.”); GreenEarth 
Cleaning, L.L.C. v. Collidoue Invest Fr., No. 09-0329-CV-W-GAF, 2009 WL 1766716, at 
*1 (W.D. Mo. June 23, 2009) (“[P]unitive damages are generally unrecoverable under 
French law . . . .”). 
 47. See also Bridas Corp. v. Unocal Corp., 16 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. App. 2000). 
 48. See Volokh, supra note 6, at 228-30 & nn.37-44; id. at 230-31 & nn.47-49. 
 49. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 
UCLA L. REV. 1465, 1468 & n.6 (1999). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 1550 n.272. 
 52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2012). 
 53. See infra notes 65-72 and accompanying text. 
 54. See generally Volokh, supra note 49. 
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religiously mandated dress or facial hair, or using peyote in a religious 
ceremony). The federal Civil Rights Act similarly gives employees, public 
or private, the right to an exemption from generally applicable work rules 
that interfere with the employees’ religious practices, unless the exemption 
would work an “undue hardship” on an employer.55  
Under these rules, Muslim employees could sometimes claim 
exemptions from some employer dress codes or hairstyle rules.56 Muslim 
litigants or witnesses could claim exemptions from court rules that require 
people to keep their heads uncovered in court.57 Muslims could ask for time 
off to pray58 or days off for religious holidays.59 Muslim cab drivers could 
ask for the right to refuse to carry passengers who are visibly carrying 
alcohol, despite a generally applicable policy requiring cab drivers to take 
all comers.60 
But again, the Muslim claimants would simply be seeking an application 
of American law, though based on their felt religious obligation to comply 
with Sharia. In this respect, Muslims are again just like Christians, Jews, 
and others. Christians, Jews, and Sikhs have on many occasions claimed 
exemptions from employer uniform or grooming requirements.61 Jews and 
Sikhs have claimed exemptions from requirements that they take off their 
                                                                                                                 
 55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e-2(a); see also Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 
U.S. 63 (1977). 
 56. See Eugene Volokh, Security Guard’s Right to Wear a Religious Headscarf, THE 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 12, 2011, 6:00 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/12/12/security-
guards-right-to-wear-a-religious-headscarf/. 
 57. See, e.g., Tyson v. Damore, No. Civ.A. 03-5297, 2004 WL 1837033 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 
13, 2004); In re Palmer, 386 A.2d 1112 (R.I. 1978). 
 58. Haliye v. Celestica Corp., 717 F. Supp. 2d 873 (D. Minn. 2010).  
 59. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Settles Religious 
Discrimination Lawsuit Against Berkeley School District in Illinois (Oct. 13, 2011), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/October/11-crt-1362.html; Eugene Volokh, 
$75,000 Settlement for Muslim Teacher Denied 19 Days’ Unpaid Leave for Hajj 
(Pilgrimage to Mecca), THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 14, 2011, 10:05 PM), http://volokh.
com/2011/10/14/75000-settlement-for-muslim-teacher-denied-19-days-unpaid-leave-for-
hajj-to-mecca/. 
 60. John Reinan, Got Wine at the Airport? It’s Harder to Grab a Cab, MINNEAPOLIS 
STAR TRIB., Sept. 28, 2006; Eugene Volokh, Cabs and Alcohol, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(Sept. 29, 2006, 12:31 PM), http://volokh.com/2006/09/29/cabs-and-alcohol/. 
 61. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (Jewish Air Force 
psychologist who objected to a no-headgear rule); Jenkins v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 646 F. 
Supp. 2d 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (female Pentecostal employee who objected to having to wear 
pants); Kalsi v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 62 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (Sikh employee 
who objected to a hardhat requirement when that interfered with his ability to wear a 
religiously prescribed turban). 
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headgear in court.62 Christians, Jews, and members of other religions have 
claimed the right not to work on their Sabbaths and holy days, or even to 
take religious trips of a week or longer.63 Christians have at times asked for 
the right to refuse to do certain job tasks that they see as religiously 
forbidden.64  
Of course, not all these claims are accepted. In some situations, a court 
may conclude that denying a religious exemption is indeed necessary to 
serve a compelling government interest. Florida, for instance, has a 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act,65 but when a Muslim woman who wore 
                                                                                                                 
 62. See Atkin v. Parana, No. CIV-86-1075E, 1987 WL 16459 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 
1987); Close-It Enters. v. Weinberger, 407 N.Y.S.2d 587 (App. Div. 1978); Plaintiff’s 
Original Petition, Singh v. Cercone (n.d.), available at http://www.aclutx.org/files/070831.
SinghFinalPetition.pdf; Dallas County Changes Policy to Settle Turban Case, SIKH AM. 
LEG. DEF. & EDUC. FUND (Sept. 30, 2008), http://www.saldef.org/saldef-news/dallas-county-
changes-policy-to-settle-turban-case/. 
 63. See, e.g., Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 452, 455 (7th Cir. 
2013) (concluding that an employer may have had a duty to accommodate an employee’s 
request for a three-week unpaid leave coupled with a week of accrued vacation, so the 
employee, who apparently adhered to a mix of Christianity and local Nigerian practices, 
could return to Nigeria to perform funeral rites for his father); Tiano v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, 
Inc., 139 F.3d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 1998) (involving a request for accommodation of a two-
week-long pilgrimage to a visitation of the Virgin Mary, but concluding that this particular 
claimant didn’t show that she had a religious obligation to go on this pilgrimage at this 
particular time); EEOC v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 914 F.2d 71, 74 (5th Cir. 1990) (concluding 
that an employer may have a duty to accommodate a Christian employee’s religious obli-
gation to not work during a seven-day holiday period). 
 64. See, e.g., Am. Postal Workers Union v. Postmaster Gen., 781 F.2d 772, 776-77 (9th 
Cir. 1986) (concluding that the postal service had a duty to reasonably accommodate, 
through transfer to a comparably paid job, postal workers who had a religious objection to 
processing draft registration forms); Gavin v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 613 F.2d 482, 483-
84 (3d Cir. 1980) (discussing, but not resolving, a Jehovah’s Witness employee’s objection 
to part of his job tasks, which involved having to raise and lower a flag); Haring v. 
Blumenthal, 471 F. Supp. 1172, 1182 (D.D.C. 1979) (concluding that the IRS had an 
obligation to exempt an employee from having to work on tax-exempt status applications 
from abortion clinics and other organizations that the employee thought it sinful to deal 
with); Best v. Cal. Apprenticeship Council, 207 Cal. Rptr. 863, 868 (Ct. App. 1984) (con-
cluding that an apprentice training organization—which was treated by state law as an em-
ployer—had an obligation to accommodate an apprentice’s religious objection to working in 
a nuclear power plant); David Haldane, Panel Backs Fired Vegetarian Bus Driver, L.A. 
TIMES, Aug. 24, 1996, at A18 (discussing a case in which the EEOC concluded that a trans-
portation agency must accommodate a vegetarian bus driver’s religious objections to 
“hand[ing] out coupons for free hamburgers as part of a promotion to boost ridership”); 
Felhaber, Larson, Fenlon, & Vogt, P.A., Bits and Pieces, MINN. EMP’T L. LETTER, Sept. 
1997 (reporting that the case against the transportation agency was settled for $50,000). 
 65. FLA. STAT. §§ 761.01-.05 (1998).  
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a full veil sought an exemption from the requirement that every driver have 
a license with an uncovered photograph, a trial court found that there was a 
compelling safety interest in denying the exemption.66 
Similarly, a court may conclude that denying a religious exemption from 
a workplace policy would impose an “undue hardship” on an employer. The 
Third Circuit, for instance, rejected the Title VII religious accommodation 
claim of a Muslim policewoman who sought to wear a headscarf.67 Such an 
accommodation, the court concluded, would pose an undue hardship for the 
police department, because it would undermine the “image of a disciplined, 
identifiable and impartial police force.”68 The uniform, the court said, was 
an important “symbol of neutral government authority, free from 
expressions of personal religion, bent or bias.”69  
Likewise, the Eighth Circuit rejected a headscarf accommodation claim 
brought by a woman who sought placement as a temporary worker at a 
commercial printing company.70 Such an accommodation, the court 
reasoned, could cause safety problems because the scarves could get caught 
up in machinery; the accommodation therefore was not required by Title 
VII.71 Many objectors will have their accommodation claims rejected, 
depending on the particular accommodation that is being claimed and the 
particular burdens it imposes.72 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Freeman v. State, No. 2002-CA-2828, 2003 WL 21338619, at *6 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 
6, 2003), aff’d on other grounds, 924 So. 2d 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). For litigation 
involving non-Muslims who likewise sought a religious exemption from the photograph 
requirement, compare Valov v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 174, 184 (Ct. App. 
2005) (denying exemption because granting exemption would undermine the compelling 
interest in safety), and Johnson v. Motor Vehicle Div., Dep’t of Revenue, 593 P.2d 1363, 
1366 (Colo. 1979) (same); with Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121, 1127 (8th Cir. 1984) 
(2-1 decision) (granting exemption on the theory that the government had other means of 
adequately promoting this interest), aff’d by an equally divided court sub nom. Jensen v. 
Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985), Dennis v. Charnes, 646 F. Supp. 158, 163 (D. Colo. 1986) 
(same), and Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Pentecostal House of Prayer, Inc., 380 N.E.2d 
1225, 1229 (Ind. 1978) (same). 
 67. Webb v. City of Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256, 264 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 68. Id. at 261 (quoting the unchallenged testimony of Sylvester Johnson, police 
commissioner). 
 69. Id. 
 70. EEOC v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 598 F.3d 1022, 1033 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 71. Id. at 1032. 
 72. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of Religious Exemptions—A 
Research Agenda with Test Suites, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 595, 642-52 (1999) (giving many 
examples). 
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Indeed, this helps illustrate why accepting one religious exemption 
claim—for instance, from a no-beards rule or from an airport cab driver 
regulation—won’t put us on a “slippery slope” to accepting all exemption 
claims, such as claims related to spousal rape or female genital mutilation.73 
Courts dealing with Christian and Jewish religious accommodation claims 
have long drawn lines between claims that should be accepted, because the 
claims don’t interfere with compelling government interests or pose an 
undue hardship to employers, and claims that should be rejected. Courts 
have not slipped down the slope towards accommodating heinous religious 
practices that seriously harm others. If anything, religious accommodations 
have generally been granted rather sparingly.74 There’s little reason to think 
that there’d be any more slippage towards bad results when it comes to 
Muslim religious accommodation claims. 
Of course, devout Muslims might not distinguish among Muslim 
religious beliefs, choosing some to follow and some to ignore. Instead they 
may seek to follow all such beliefs. Likewise, Orthodox Jews sometimes 
disapprove of a focus on the Ten Commandments, reasoning that the Torah 
contains 613 commandments, all of them God’s will.75 But that’s the 
religious believers’ view; it is not the view of our legal system. 
If a Muslim woman seeks to keep her headscarf on while in court, 
despite a no-head-covering rule, a court should deal with that request on its 
own terms and should likely grant it, much as courts have granted similar 
requests for other religions.76 If a Muslim woman seeks to have her driver’s 
license photograph taken with her veil on, a court should deal with that 
request on its own terms, and may reject it; lower courts dealing with 
similar claims by non-Muslims have been split on that question.77 That the 
                                                                                                                 
 73. I generally think slippery slope arguments are often sound and need to be taken 
seriously. See generally Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. 
L. REV. 1026 (2003). But they have to be evaluated in light of the risk of slippage in each 
particular scenario, and in this instance, it seems to me that the risk of slippage is slight for 
reasons given in the text. 
 74. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of 
Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1245, 1247 (1994); Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State 
RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV. 466, 481-82 (2010); James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1427-28 
(1992).  
 75. See, e.g., A List of the 613 Mitzvot (Commandments), JUDAISM 101, http://www. 
jewfaq.org/613.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2013). 
 76. See supra notes 57, 62. 
 77. See supra note 66. 
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courtroom headscarf request is accepted doesn’t mean the license veil 
request must be accepted, too. That the license veil request is rejected 
doesn’t mean that the courtroom headscarf request must be rejected as well. 
And again the important point is that Muslims are using the same laws to 
seek religious exemptions that Christians, Jews, and others have long had 
available. In dealing with Muslim accommodation requests, there’s no need 
to create special rules, either “pro-Sharia” or “anti-Sharia.” Rather, all that 
courts must do is apply the well-established American religious 
accommodation rules the same way they do for members of other religions. 
My point here is not to defend broadly applicable religious 
accommodation rules or to suggest that they should be broadened further. 
Some readers may disapprove of such rules and conclude that religious 
objections shouldn’t entitle the objector to exemption from generally 
applicable laws or work rules. But my point here is simply that there’s 
nothing nefarious about applying existing American law to Muslim 
Americans’ accommodation requests just as it applies to other Americans’ 
accommodation requests. 
VI. Providing Accommodations That Benefit Muslim Customers, 
Employees, Students, or Clients 
Government entities also often provide accommodations that benefit 
religious customers, employees, students, or clients, beyond what is 
mandated by religious exemption regimes. Many such accommodations 
seek not to create exceptions from rules that forbid religiously motivated 
behavior (as in Part V), but rather to generally make life easier for the 
religious practitioner. And in the process they make the government entity’s 
services more appealing or more efficient at serving client needs.  
For instance, some public schools in areas with many Muslim students 
have added some Muslim holidays to their school closing days (rather than 
just letting students who celebrate those holidays take the day off).78 
Likewise, some universities have provided foot-washing basins for Muslim 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Illinois School District Is Slowly Becoming Sharia-Compliant, BARE NAKED ISLAM 
(Feb. 2, 2013), http://www.barenakedislam.com/2013/02/02/illinois-school-district-is-
slowly-becoming-sharia-compliant/; creeping, NYC Dem Mayoral Candidates Pander to 
Muslims, Promise Muslim School Holidays, CREEPING SHARIA (July 16, 2013), http://
creepingsharia.wordpress.com/2013/07/16/nyc-dem-mayoral-candidates-pander-to-muslims-
promise-muslim-school-holidays/; William J. Murray, Mass. School District to Close 
Tuesday for Islamic Religious Holiday, SHARIA AWARENESS ACTION NETWORK (Nov. 7, 
2011), http://shariafreeusa.com/mass-school-district-to-close-tuesday-for-islamic-religious-
holiday/ (reprinting an article authored by Billy Hallowell for TheBlaze.com). 
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students, which make it easier for them to wash before prayer.79 San 
Francisco International Airport has provided a foot-washing station for cab 
drivers.80 Government-run cafeterias might stock halal food.81 Government 
lenders have offered to structure loans in ways that formally avoid the 
payment of interest, while giving the lender an economic return identical to 
what interest-paying borrowers would provide.82  
All this has led to complaints about the government supposedly 
enforcing or following Sharia.83 But, again, these incidents simply involve 
Muslims following in a long tradition of Christians’ and Jews’ asking for, 
and often getting, similar accommodations. Thus, for instance, in places 
where there are many Jewish students and teachers, schools close on Jewish 
holidays, because that’s more convenient for everyone given the likely 
absenteeism on those days.84 Some schools likewise close on Good 
                                                                                                                 
 79. Carol Iannone, How Muslim Footbaths Threaten America’s Social Fabric, N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS (Feb. 12, 2008, 7:11 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/muslim-
footbaths-threaten-america-social-fabric-article-1.311574. 
 80. Matier & Ross, Airport’s Garage Now Muslim House of Worship, SFGATE.COM 
(June 9, 2013, 4:02 AM), http://blog.sfgate.com/matierandross/2013/06/09/airports-garage-
now-muslim-house-of-worship/; Thomas Lifson, City of San Francisco Funds Religious 
Place of Worship, AMERICAN THINKER (June 10, 2013), http://www. americanthinker.com/
blog/2013/06/city_of_san_francisco_funds_religious_place_of_worship.html. 
 81. Emily Smith, Colorado State Dining Halls Now Serve Halal Meat, COLLEGIAN.COM 
(Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.collegian.com/2012/10/colorado-state-dining-halls-now-serve-
halal-meat-2/15073/; creeper, Sharia Compliant Meals Now Served at Colorado State Univ 
. . . for 26 Muslims, CREEPING SHARIA (Oct. 23, 2012), http://creepingsharia.
wordpress.com/2012/10/23/sharia-compliant-meals-now-served-at-colorado-state-univ-for-
26-muslims/. 
 82. See, e.g., Murray v. Geithner, 763 F. Supp. 2d 860, 863-64 (E.D. Mich. 2011). 
 83. See, e.g., Iannone, supra note 79; Lifson, supra note 80.  
 84. Kerry Brown, Mount Laurel Moves School Start to Accommodate Rosh Hashanah, 
CENTRAL RECORD (July 16, 2013), http://www.southjerseylocalnews.com/articles/2013/07/
16/news/doc51e555030f34d908743658.txt (quoting a district spokeswoman as saying, “The 
first day of Rosh Hashanah is a school holiday each year, not specifically for religious reasons, 
but because of the rate of absenteeism. Traditionally, the second day of Rosh Hashanah is not a 
high absenteeism day for our district, and it’s never a school holiday.”); Opening of School 
Term Postponed Because of Rosh Hashanah, JTA (July 23, 1953), http://www.jta.org/ 
1953/07/23/jewish-holidays/rosh-hashanah/opening-of-school-term-postponed-because-of-
rosh-hashanah; Portland School Board Revises Calendar to Avoid Rosh Hashanah Conflict, JP 
UPDATES (May 30, 2013, 7:01 AM), http://jpupdates.com/2013/05/30/portland-school-board-
revises-calendar-to-avoid-rosh-hashanah-conflict/; Stephen Prothero, Should Schools Scrap 
Religious Holidays?, USA TODAY, Dec. 19, 2010. 
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Friday,85 and the school calendar of our majority Christian nation 
automatically provides for days off on Christmas and Sundays.86 
Some cities let Jewish groups use city property to support an “eruv,” 
which is basically a string connecting various poles that is seen by 
Orthodox Jews as giving them more flexibility to do various things on the 
Sabbath within the boundaries delimited by that string.87 Likewise, 
government-run liquor stores might stock kosher wine,88 and government-
run cafeterias might provide kosher food.89 There is no reason to 
categorically reject Muslims’ requests for these sorts of accommodations 
when Jews’ and Christians’ requests are often accepted.  
To be sure, one can’t just say here, as I’ve said above, that courts should 
apply the same existing legal rules for Muslims as for others. The 
accommodations discussed in this section are implemented not by courts 
pursuant to some generally available law—such as a Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act or the Civil Rights Act—but by other government agencies 
on an ad hoc basis, as the agencies learn of such needs or desires among 
their students, customers, clients, or employees. 
                                                                                                                 
 85. Good Friday—School Closed, SADDLE BROOK SCH. DISTRICT, http://www.saddle
brookschools.org/good-friday-school-closed (last visited Sept. 7, 2013). 
 86. Some Good Friday closing laws have been struck down as violations of the 
Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Metzl v. Leininger, 57 F.3d 618, 622-24 (7th Cir. 1995). But 
when schools have a secular justification for the closing, such as the high rate of absences on 
a particular holiday, the closing is permissible. Id. at 621, 623 (noting that the problem with 
the law was that “all public schools throughout the state are forced to close on Good Friday 
regardless of the preference of local school districts and no matter how small the number of 
students or teachers in a particular district who want to use the day for religious 
observances”); Granzeier v. Middleton, 173 F.3d 568, 575–76 (6th Cir. 1999) (upholding 
Good Friday closing, partly because it is proper for government officials to consider the 
“practicalities of school or court attendance that might otherwise be disrupted”). 
 87. See, e.g., Tenafly Eruv Ass’n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 152 (3d 
Cir. 2002). 
 88. See Festive Wines for Your Passover and Easter Tables, N.H. LIQUOR COMM’N, 
http://www.nh.gov/liquor/wineforeaster.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2013); Product Inventory: 
11296 Herzog Merlot Kosher 750ml, N.H. LIQUOR COMM’N, http://ice.liquor.nh.gov/public/
default.asp?Category=inquiries&Service=prodfindpost&req=11296 (last visited Sept. 7, 
2013). 
 89. Museum Cafe, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, http://www. ushmm.org/
information/museum-cafe (last visited Sept. 20, 2013); Massachusetts State Agency Food 
Standards, MASS. EXEC. OFFICE OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.mass.gov/
eohhs/docs/dph/com-health/nutrition-phys-activity/eo509-state-agency-food-standards.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 20, 2013); Metropolitan Food Services, BROOKLYN COLLEGE, 
http://www.brooklyn.cuny.edu/web/about/offices/metropolitan.php (last visited Sept. 7, 
2013). 
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But government agencies can, and should, try to deal with such ad hoc 
requests without regard to whether they came from Muslims, Christians, or 
Jews. Flexible agencies will generally implement such an accommodation 
if:  
 
o many of the employees, students, customers, or clients have a 
particular preference (religious or otherwise), 
 
o accommodating that preference will substantially improve 
customer, client, or employee relations, or help better serve the 
public that the agency is trying to serve (something government 
agencies generally try to do), and 
 
o such an accommodation will impose only modest costs on the 
agency and on other customers, clients, or employees. 
 
And decisions to grant such accommodations should not turn on which 
religion motivated the request for the accommodation. 
VII. Exempting Muslims from Generally Applicable Laws Because of Their 
Religious or Cultural Background, Even in the Absence of Any Interference 
with Religious Practice 
Occasionally, American laws have exempted members of certain 
religious groups simply on the grounds that the law is a law for the 
majority, and the minority deserves its own legal system. These exemptions 
are distantly related to the “millet” family law model in countries such as 
Israel and India, discussed in Part IV.A, where family law questions are 
delegated to each religious group’s own religious courts.  
For instance, one of the religious accommodations enacted in 1700s 
America was a Rhode Island statute that exempted Jews from the ban on 
uncle-niece marriage.90 Nothing in Orthodox Judaism requires uncles to 
marry nieces, so this was not the sort of exemption for religious objectors to 
generally applicable laws that the preceding Part discussed. Still, 
historically Judaism hasn’t forbidden uncle-niece marriage, because the 
Leviticus passages prohibiting incest do not include uncles and nieces.91 
                                                                                                                 
 90. An Act Regulating Marriage and Divorce, 1798 R.I. Pub. L. 477, 481; Benjamin H. 
Hartogensis, Rhode Island and Consanguineous Jewish Marriages, 20 PUBLICATION AM. 
JEWISH HIST. SOC’Y 137, 144 (1911) (asserting that the statute dates back to 1764). 
 91. Leviticus 8:6–18. 
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And the Rhode Island legislature apparently took the view that the Christian 
laws of incest made sense for Christians, but the Jews should have their 
own rules. 
This seems to be what happened in the New Jersey case that rejected a 
restraining order against a Moroccan Muslim husband who had allegedly 
raped his wife.92 The Muslim couple entered into an arranged marriage in 
Morocco when the wife was seventeen.93 They moved to New Jersey a 
month later, but within two months the wife sought a restraining order, 
alleging that her husband had raped her, saying, “This is according to our 
religion. You are my wife, I c[an] do anything to you. The woman, she 
should submit and do anything I ask her to do.”94 The trial judge agreed that 
the husband had sex with the wife against her will, but concluded, 
This court does not feel that, under the circumstances, that [sic] 
this defendant had a criminal desire to or intent to sexually 
assault or to sexually contact the plaintiff when he did. The court 
believes that he was operating under his belief that it is, as the 
husband, his desire to have sex when and whether he wanted to, 
was something that was consistent with his practices and it was 
something that was not prohibited.95 
And because, in the judge’s view, the defendant lacked “a criminal desire to 
or intent to sexually assault,” the judge found there had been no sexual 
assault and refused to issue a restraining order.96  
Unsurprisingly, the appellate court reversed and remanded for entry of a 
restraining order, writing (among other things): 
Defendant’s conduct in engaging in nonconsensual sexual 
intercourse was unquestionably knowing, regardless of his view 
that his religion permitted him to act as he did. 
 As the judge recognized, the case thus presents a conflict 
between the criminal law and religious precepts. In resolving this 
conflict, the judge determined to except defendant from the 
operation of the State’s statutes as the result of his religious 
beliefs. In doing so, the judge was mistaken.97 
                                                                                                                 
 92. He was later convicted of rape. See Conte, supra note 14. 
 93. S.D. v. M.J.R., 2 A.3d 412, 412 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010).  
 94. Id. at 416.  
 95. Id. at 418.  
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. at 422. 
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The trial judge’s decision was wrong and has rightly been condemned. 
But the error was not that decisions should never consider a party’s 
religious beliefs. As we saw in Part V, some American legal rules do call 
for exempting people from some generally applicable laws based on their 
religious beliefs.  
Rather, the error is that the court made this decision without any 
authorization from American law. Whether an act constitutes sexual assault 
or justifies a restraining order does not turn on whether the person knew 
that his actions were criminal or mistakenly believed that he was entitled to 
act as he did—ignorance of the law is no excuse here. And Religious 
Freedom Restoration Acts and similar rules do not exempt husbands from 
the prohibition on rape, regardless of their religious beliefs.98 There is 
obviously a compelling government interest in preventing rape, and 
granting an exemption would interfere with that interest (the RFRA 
standard for when an exemption should be denied).99  
Indeed, the trial judge’s decision seems to rest on a sort of mistake-of-
law “cultural defense”—because the defendant came from a culture in 
which some conduct wasn’t a crime and therefore didn’t realize that it was 
a crime in America, he should not be held culpable. But these kinds of 
cultural defenses have generally been rejected by American courts, 
precisely because mistake of law is usually not a defense to criminal 
liability, whether the mistake stems from one’s cultural background or 
something else.100 The New Jersey appellate court thus rightly overturned 
the trial court’s decision. 
A hypothetical, dealing with statutory rape rather than forcible rape, can 
help illustrate the difference between an improper use of Islamic law as a 
way of trumping American law, and a proper use of Islamic law when 
American law makes it relevant. 
Consider a thirty-year-old man who visits the United States with a 
seventeen-year-old woman and has consensual sex with her. In most 
American states, that wouldn’t be a crime, since all but twelve states set the 
general age of consent at sixteen or seventeen (regardless of the age of the 
                                                                                                                 
 98. Cf. Fraley v. State, No. 97,823, 2008 WL 3367566, at *8 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 
2008) (characterizing “the argument that the marriage vows between Fraley and his wife 
rendered Fraley’s conduct not the crime of rape but rather the free exercise of religion 
guaranteed by our constitution” as “a claim that appellate counsel wisely chose to ignore in 
this appeal”). 
 99. E.g., 51 OKLA. STAT. § 253(B) (2012). 
 100. See, e.g., State v. Al-Hussaini, 579 N.W.2d 561, 563 (Neb. Ct. App. 1998). 
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other partner).101 But in California, which sets the age of consent at 
eighteen, sex with a seventeen-year-old would be a crime—unless the 
parties were married.102 
Now if a California court excused the thirty-year-old on the grounds that 
he’s from a Muslim culture that doesn’t forbid such conduct, that decision 
would be quite wrong. But say his claim is that the two were married under 
the law of Israel, where the parties were married and now live, and from 
which they were visiting Los Angeles on their honeymoon.  
To determine whether the man committed a crime under California law, 
a court would have to decide whether the two parties were indeed validly 
married under Israeli law; California law provides that a couple is married 
for California purposes if their marriage was valid where it was 
celebrated.103 In Israel, the marriage age is seventeen.104 And since Israeli 
law for Muslims is Islamic law,105 a California court applying California 
law would be obliged to consult Islamic law. 
So if under Islamic law, as applied in Israel, the couple was validly 
married in Israel, then under California law they were married as well. This 
means they haven’t committed a crime under California law. (Recall that 
California statutory rape law expressly excludes sex with one’s legal 
spouse.) An acquittal on those grounds would be quite right—indeed, it 
would be required under existing California law. 
What matters, then, isn’t whether a court making a decision is 
considering a person’s country or culture of origin. Nor does it matter 
whether the court is considering Sharia. What matters is whether the 
decision is authorized by standard, religiously neutral principles of 
American law. The New Jersey trial court’s decision was wrong, because it 
wasn’t authorized by American law; the error was the judge’s, not that of 
New Jersey law more generally, precisely because New Jersey law doesn’t 
authorize that sort of cultural defense. But a California court would be quite 
correct to dismiss the charges in the statutory rape hypothetical if the couple 
was married under the laws of Israel. 
                                                                                                                 
 101. See Eugene Volokh, What Are the Ages of Consent Throughout the Western World?, 
THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 30, 2008, 2:25 PM), http://www.volokh.com/posts/
1209579954.shtml. 
 102. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (Deering 2008). 
 103. CAL. FAMILY CODE § 308(a) (effective Jan. 1, 2010). 
 104. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ISRAEL 2012 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 20 (2012), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/204575.pdf. 
 105. Hassan v. Holder, 604 F.3d 915, 925 (6th Cir. 2010). 
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VIII. Passing Laws That Track Muslim Law Rules, or Enforcing Laws in a 
Way That Tracks Such Rules 
A city with a large Muslim population might—if state law allows it—
dramatically limit sales of alcohol, impose heavy restrictions (short of total 
bans) on strip clubs or pornography stores, or crack down on prostitution.106 
Or such a city could try to ban material that blasphemes against Islam or 
against religions generally. Or a city could use laws banning “disturbing the 
peace” to suppress allegedly blasphemous or anti-Islam speech,107 and a 
university could use campus speech codes to do the same.108 Or a city or 
school could mandate that women wear headscarves in public. What should 
our legal system do about this? 
Here again we should recognize that similar laws have been enacted in 
jurisdictions with large populations of Christian groups. Laws restricting 
alcohol sales, strip clubs, pornography stores, prostitution, blasphemy, and 
consensual sexual behavior, as well as laws that treat women differently 
from men, are familiar in American history. Some such laws are familiar in 
the American present as well, including in overwhelmingly non-Muslim 
jurisdictions.109 When those laws violate specific constitutional constraints, 
such as the Free Speech Clause or the Equal Protection Clause, they are 
struck down. But when they don’t violate such constraints, they are simply 
democracy in action. 
Nor is there anything inherently improper with people trying to enact 
their religiously based moral beliefs—e.g., about abortion, prostitution, 
alcohol, and the like—into law. Secular American voters and legislators are 
                                                                                                                 
 106. State law often leaves local governments free to enact such laws within their own 
boundaries. 
 107. See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 10; Volokh, supra note 11.  
 108. Cf., e.g., Coll. Republicans at S.F. State Univ. v. Reed, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1007-
09 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (discussing discipline of anti-Hamas students for stepping on the Hamas 
flag, which contains the word “Allah” in Arabic); Nat Hentoff, ‘Free Speech’ Cries Ring 
Hollow on College Campuses and Beyond, USA TODAY (Apr. 18, 2006, 10:31 PM), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2006-04-18-free-speech_x.htm (re-
porting on censorship of Mohammed cartoons at New York University and Century 
College); Aaron Brown, Prophet Cartoon on Door Prompts Action, THE CHICAGO MAROON 
(Feb. 17. 2006, 4:30 AM), http://chicagomaroon.com/2006/02/17/prophet-cartoon-on-door-
prompts-action/ (reporting on disciplinary investigation of a student who posted Mohammed 
cartoon on his dormitory door). 
 109. E.g., ABC Commission North Carolina, Legal Sales Areas, http://abc.nc.gov/xo/ 
(indicating which counties in North Carolina generally ban a wide range of alcohol sales); 37 
OKLA. STAT. § 591.B.1 (2012) (providing that counties may ban alcoholic beverage sales on 
Sundays). 
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entitled (subject to the Free Speech Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, 
and similar constraints) to use the law to implement their views about what 
is right or wrong and harmful or useful, even if the views rest on moral 
assumptions that are unproven and unprovable. Christian voters and 
legislators are similarly entitled to implement their views, even when those 
views rest on Christian religious beliefs.110 Muslim voters and legislators 
are entitled to do likewise. 
IX. The “Islam Is Different” Argument 
I have argued that many (though not all) of the things that are 
condemned as intrusions of Islamic law into American law are actually the 
applications of traditional American legal principles. Those who believe in 
equal treatment without regard to religion, I have argued, should extend to 
Muslims the benefits of those principles just as Christians, Jews, and others 
can take advantage of those principles. 
Some, however, have argued that Islam should not be treated the same as 
those other religions. One line of argument goes so far as to say (in the 
words of noted televangelist and political figure Pat Robertson) that “Islam 
is not a religion. It is a political system bent on world domination.”111 
It’s hard to figure out exactly what the first part of this means. What 
constitutes a religion for legal purposes can be fuzzy around the edges,112 
but surely Islam—a prominent system of beliefs about God and God’s 
supposed commands to mankind—must qualify.113 The argument, I assume, 
                                                                                                                 
 110. E.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961) (upholding Sunday closing 
laws); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 n.30 (1983) (upholding denial of 
tax exemption to university that discriminated based on race); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 
297, 319–20 (1980) (upholding ban on government funding of abortion). 
 111. The Ed Show with Ed Schultz (MSNBC television broadcast Dec. 20, 2011); see 
also WILLIAM J. DELL, OUR CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC: SEEDS OF BIRTH - SEEDS OF 
DESTRUCTION 156 (2011); JR Dieckmann, Islam Is Not a Religion, It Is Foreign Law, 
CANADA FREE PRESS (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.canadafreepress.com/index.php/article/
27211. 
 112. See generally Jesse H. Choper, Defining “Religion” in the First Amendment, 1982 
U. ILL. L. REV. 579; Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. 
L. REV. 753 (1984). 
 113. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 
525 (1993) (characterizing Islam as a religion protected by the First Amendment); Wallace 
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-53 (1985) (likewise). Indeed, Pat Robertson’s statement came a 
few sentences after he had called Islam a “violent religion,” which seems to admit that it is a 
religion (though the other sources I cite do not make such an admission). The Ed Show, 
supra note 111. 
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must be that Islam, though it is a religion, is not simply a religion but is also 
a political ideology and therefore loses its status as a religion for, say, 
religious accommodation purposes. 
But that can’t be right. Many religions, especially many strands of 
Christianity, are “political system[s]” in the sense that they create an agenda 
for political action. The conservative Christian political program of Jerry 
Falwell, Pat Robertson, and others is one example.114 The “liberation 
theology” followed by some liberal Catholics is another.115  
Nor is this surprising. Religions often teach adherents that certain 
conduct (such as slavery, abortion, or failure to help the poor) is against 
God’s will, morally wrong, and a violation of the rights with which people 
are endowed by their creator. In such situations, many of the adherents and 
their leaders understandably think it imperative to implement those 
religious commands into secular law. 
And of course many strands of Christianity seek “world domination” in 
the sense of seeking to have the world convert to that strand of Christianity 
(hence the Christian missionary tradition). That too is entirely 
understandable. If one believes that one knows God’s true will, and if one 
believes that following a particular understanding of God is the key to 
salvation, one might reasonably want to persuade everyone to embrace that 
understanding. 
This doesn’t mean that Christianity and Islam are equally sound, morally 
or theologically. Most Christians and most Muslims would disagree with 
any such equation, thinking their religion to be better than the other. But 
whatever the difference between the religions, it can’t be that one is a 
“political system” and the other is not, or that one seeks “world 
domination” and the other does not. 
Sometimes, one hears more specific objections to equal legal treatment 
from Islam, such as the argument that Islam does not respect religious 
freedom for other religions, and that if America became dominated by 
Muslims, then Christians and Jews would be relegated to second-class 
status. This is indeed true of many Muslim countries, where conversion 
from Islam to another religion is criminally punishable, theoretically by 
                                                                                                                 
 114. See generally SUSAN FRIEND HARDING, THE BOOK OF JERRY FALWELL: FUNDAMEN-
TALIST LANGUAGE AND POLITICS (2001).  
 115.  See generally GUSTAVO GUTIÉRREZ, A THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION: HISTORY, 
POLITICS, AND SALVATION (Sister Caridad Inda & John Eagleson trans., 15th ed. 2012). 
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death.116 Likewise, in Saudi Arabia, Christian churches are not allowed to 
publicly operate.117 
But nothing in the First Amendment limits its protection (including its 
protection against discrimination based on religion118) to those who support 
religious freedom. People who support punishment for blasphemy—as 
many American Christians had in the past119—are protected by the First 
Amendment. Pre-Vatican-II Catholics who believed that the religious 
freedom of non-Catholics could properly be restricted were nonetheless 
protected by the First Amendment.120  
People who want to set up Christianity as an official state religion are 
protected by the First Amendment.121 So are people who overtly call for 
constructing a “theocracy” that “denies the religious liberty of the enemies 
of God.”122 
                                                                                                                 
 116. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CHALLENGES TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY REPORTS 2 (2011), available at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/ 172440.pdf (“[B]lasphemy and conversion from Islam, which is 
considered apostasy, are punishable by death in Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi 
Arabia.”). 
 117. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT FOR 2012: 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 (2013), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
208324.pdf. 
 118. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. 520; Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). 
 119. See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Zeisweiss v. James, 
63 Pa. 465 (1870); Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 206 (1838); State v. 
Chandler, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 553 (1837); Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394 
(Pa. 1824); People v. Porter, 2 Park. Crim. Rep. 14 (N.Y. Ct. Oyer & Terminer 1823); Jared 
W. Bell’s Case, 6 N.Y. City Hall Rec. 38 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1821); Commonwealth v. Murray 
(Phila. Mayor’s Ct. 1818), reported at Law Intelligence, FRANKLIN GAZETTE, Nov. 17, 1818, 
at 2; People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. Cas. 290 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811). 
 120. “Catholic support for religious freedom was a historic reversal of the Catholic 
Church’s traditional view that ‘error has no rights.’ Prior to Vatican II, there was little reli-
gious freedom in Catholic countries.” Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Catholic and Evangelical Sup-
reme Court Justices: A Theological Analysis, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 296, 307 (2006) 
(footnote omitted). 
 121. This includes 32% of respondents in an April 2013 poll, who said they favored “a 
Constitutional amendment which would make Christianity the official religion of the United 
States,” and 34% who said they favored “establishing Christianity as the official state 
religion in [their] state.” YouGov, Omnibus Poll, HUFFINGTON POST, http://big.assets.
 huffingtonpost.com/toplines_churchstate_0403042013.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2013); 
Emily Swanson, Christianity as State Religion Supported by One-Third of Americans, Poll 
Finds, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 6, 2013, 9:19 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/ 
04/06/christianity-state-religion_n_3022255.html. 
 122. See Gary North, The Intellectual Schizophrenia of the New Christian Right, 1 
CHRISTIANITY & CIVILIZATION 1, 25 (1982): 
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People who want to restrict speech that the First Amendment has been 
held to protect are likewise protected by the First Amendment. So are 
people who want to ban guns. So are people who want to abolish private 
property.123 So are people who want to ban abortions.  
So are people who want the government to discriminate based on 
religion or race—discrimination that would very likely be seen by courts as 
unconstitutional—including those who want the government to discriminate 
against Islam.124 So are people who want to ban homosexuality (contrary to 
the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution). Neither the freedom of 
speech nor the freedom of religion is limited to people who believe in 
values that are compatible with American constitutional guarantees. 
Of course, when people try to turn their beliefs into actions, the law may 
well intervene. If legislators, whether Muslim or Christian, enact a 
blasphemy ban, it will be struck down.125 If citizens, whether Muslim or 
Christian, decide to attack blasphemers, they will be guilty of assault and 
should be criminally punished.  
Even if they try to claim a religious exemption from assault law, they 
will lose, because granting the exemption will undermine the compelling 
government interest in protecting the victims of the assault. The same is 
true if extremist Christians or Jews read Leviticus as calling for private 
violence against adulterers, homosexuals, or blasphemers.126 
But having wrongheaded or even dangerous beliefs doesn’t strip people 
of their other rights. Say someone feels a religious obligation to wear 
religiously mandated headgear, whether a Jewish yarmulke, a Catholic 
nun’s habit, a Sikh turban, an Orthodox Jewish woman’s headscarf, or a 
                                                                                                                 
So let us be blunt about it: we must use the doctrine of religious liberty to gain 
independence for Christian schools until we train up a generation of people 
who know that there is no religious neutrality, no neutral law, no neutral 
education, and no neutral civil government. Then they will get busy in 
constructing a Bible-based social, political, and religious order which finally 
denies the religious liberty of the enemies of God. Murder, abortion, and 
pornography will be illegal. God’s law will be enforced. It will take time. A 
minority religion cannot do this. Theocracy must flow from the hearts of a 
majority of citizens, just as compulsory education came only after most people 
had their children in schools of some sort. 
 123. See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982); 
Communist Party of Ind. v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441 (1974). 
 124. See, e.g., Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992); Nat’l 
Socialist Party of Am. v. Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977). 
 125. E.g., Kalman v. Cortes, 723 F. Supp. 2d 766, 806 (E.D. Pa. 2010).  
 126. See Leviticus 20:10, 20:13, 24:16. 
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Muslim woman’s headscarf, and therefore claims an exemption from a no-
headgear rule. That person’s exemption claim is judged—and should be 
judged—without regard to whether the rest of the person’s religious beliefs 
are considered good or bad. 
X. Conclusion 
Generally, our legal system has long reached sensible results when it 
comes to accommodating religious believers. It has generally accepted 
modest claims to exemptions. It has generally accepted most manifestations 
of freedom of contract and freedom to dispose property by will. It has 
generally left people at the local level free to engage in democratic self-
government, including in places where religious minorities have political 
power. At the same time, it has generally rejected excessive claims, or 
claims that unduly interfere with others or with the interests of society as a 
whole.  
Our legal system’s recent interactions with Muslim claimants have 
largely followed the same pattern. Our traditional legal rules can function 
just as well in the coming years, whether as to Muslims or as to others, so 
long as the legal system subjects Muslims to the same rules under which 
Christians, Jews, and others live. 
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